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Critical geopolitics has become one of the most vibrant parts of political geography. However it remains a
particularly western way of knowing which has been much less attentive to other traditions of thinking.
This paper engages with Pan-Africanism, and speciﬁcally the vision of the architect of post-colonial
Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, to explore this overlooked contribution to critical engagements with geopoli-
tics. Pan-Africanism sought to forge alternative post-colonial worlds to the binary geopolitics of the Cold
War and the geopolitical economy of neo-colonialism. The academic division of labour has meant that
these ideas have been consigned to African studies rather than being drawn into wider debates around
the deﬁnitions of key disciplinary concepts. However Nyerere’s continental thinking can be seen as a
form of geopolitical imagination that challenges dominant neo-realist projections, and which still has
much to offer contemporary political geography.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.We, the people of Tanganyika, would like to light a candle and
put it on the top of Mount Kilimanjaro, which would shine
beyond our borders, giving hope where there was despair, love
where there was hate and dignity where before there was only
humiliation. President Julius K. Nyerere on Tanganyika’s inde-
pendence, 1961.
Critical geopolitics has become one of the most vibrant parts of
political geography since the concept was ﬁrst introduced by
Gearoid Ó Tuathail in the late 1980s. From its initial concern with
the scripting of global geographical political relations in the formal
realms of statecraft, critical geopolitics has undergone a number of
revisions and reworkings; broadening from the rareﬁed workings
of statecraft to the ways inwhich hegemonic geopolitical narratives
are established in wider society, and shifting from a focus on the
statements of (male) political elites to the embodied experiences of
scalar politics by a range of people and publics.
However, through all of this, and although not the initial
intention,1 critical geopolitics remains a particularly westernway of
knowing which has been much less attentive to other traditions of
thinking through international politics and the role of the nation
and citizen within these narratives. I wish to return to the 1960sr Ltd. Open access under CC BY licenseand 1970s and to the discourses and practices of Pan-Africanism
which sought to forge alternative post-colonial worlds to the bi-
nary geopolitics of the Cold War and the geopolitical economy of
neo-colonialism ewhat I have referred to elsewhere as “subaltern
geopolitics” (Sharp, 2011b, 2011c). Speciﬁcally, I want to discuss the
geopolitical vision of the architect of post-colonial Tanzania, Julius
Nyerere, who, as the opening quote suggests, offered a geopolitical
vision of hope and inclusion, one that recognised shared precarity
rather than sought to shut out difference. The geopolitics of the
academic division of labour, so brilliantly explained by Pletsch
(1981), has meant that Nyerere’s ideas have been consigned to
African studies rather than being drawn into wider debates around
the deﬁnitions of key disciplinary concepts. I suggest that Nyerere’s
contribution to geopolitical thinking is signiﬁcant; his continental
thinking is a form of geopolitical imagination that challenges
dominant neo-realist projections. While the optimism of the hey-
day of Pan-Africanism might have dissipated in the face of neolib-
eral structural adjustment programmes, such visions may still have
much to offer contemporary political geography.
Genealogies of critical geopolitics
The study of geopolitics is the study of the spatialisation of in-
ternational politics by core powers and hegemonic states (Ó
Tuathail & Agnew, 1992: 192).
In an editorial in Geopolitics in 2010, Power quotes Perry’s
summary of the state of political geography 23 year years earlier as.
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American political geography poses and pursues a limited and
impoverished version of the discipline, largely ignoring the political
concerns of four ﬁfths of humankind” (Perry, 1987, quoted in Power,
2010: 433). Despite the global gaze of political geography, it is still,
in many ways, subject to “parochial forms of theorising” (Robinson,
2003). Although, of course, there is much political geography based
outside the west (see, for example, Sidaway & Simon, 1993; Slater,
2004), Darby’s (2004: 6) critique of the core concepts in interna-
tional relations theory is equally relevant here: the “decolonisation
of the international has barely begun” (see also Tickner, 2003).
More speciﬁcally, James Tyner has argued that “Our geographies,
and especially our political geographies, remain largely distant
from non-European theorists and theories. Our texts on nation-
alism and identities, in particular, are woefully ignorant of Pan-
African nationalism and other African diasporic movements”
(Tyner, 2004: 343; see also Gilmore, 2008).
Slater (1998), following Chakrabarty’s (1992) insistence of the
need to “provincialise Europe”, argues that it is necessary to go
beyond an image of the Third World as a conceptually empty space
to be ﬁlled with western knowledge, on the one hand, and as a
place full of resistance to westernways and ‘indigenous knowledge’
on the other. Third World2 scholars should be regarded as theorists
in their own right, not only offering reﬂection on local conditions
(see also Mignolo, 2002; Pletsch, 1981). Despite their suggestion of
universalism, conventional western accounts of cosmopolitanism
have tended to marginalise other expressions of transnational
connection. Expanding on this point, Featherstone (2007: 434)
outlines a subaltern cosmopolitanism which “emphasizes the
multiple geographies through which different forms of cosmopol-
itanism are constituted [which.] permits a focus on the diverse
forms of political identity and agency constituted through different
forms of cosmopolitanism”. While his work focuses on rather more
“unruly patterns of ﬂows”, his description is also apposite for
challenges such as Pan-Africanismwhich he suggests “evokes types
of political activity that have contested dominant forms of global-
ization, but have eschewed, challenged or exceeded bounded forms
of the local” (Featherstone, 2007: 435, 2012; see also Slater, 1998).
The importance of recovering these alternative networks of global
connection is to challenge even the most critical forms of cosmo-
politanism in which, “it is the privileged and hospitable ‘we’ that
extends the invitation to liberal planetary consciousness when
cosmopolitanism is normalised as universality; cosmopolitanism
itself becomes a ‘god trick’” (Jazeel, 2011: 84). The challenge is to
recognise difference without rendering it purely as exotic.
Similar discussions have also been taking place in international
relations theory, which has been characterised as equally struggling
to think past Western IR, to paraphrase Bilgin (2008; see also
Guillaume, 2007). Among the challenges to classical realism is
Mohammed Ayoob’s project of proposing a “subaltern realism”
which highlights the dominance of subalterity: “It is the common
experience of all human societies that these are the elements that
constitute the large majority of any members of any social system”
(Ayoob, 2002: 40e41). Certainly in the post-colonial era, the vast
majority of violent conﬂicts have taken place in the territory of
subaltern states, evenwhen dominant states have been involved in,
or indeed have been the driving force behind, conﬂict. Ayoob’s
(2010: 129) perspective offers a different set of principles for in-
ternational relations; as he puts it, the “tension between the heg-
emonic and subaltern perspectives of international order can be
summarised in the following fashion:While the former emphasizes
order among states and justice within them, the latter stresses
order within states and justice among them”.
Ayoob’s realism is one which acknowledges the interdepen-
dency of international and domestic politics, but insists that,despite the importance of other scales of political activity and
identity, the state is still the preeminent actor, and thus the goal for
Third World societies; after all, Third World societies came into
post-colonial being as states e however false their boundaries e
and have had to struggle for independence. Thus, subaltern realism
is a critique of conventional realism which considers only the ex-
periences of the Great Powers as having relevance to the unfolding
of world events. Realist champion Kenneth Waltz famously argued
that ‘Denmark does not matter’. Such accounts serve to perpetuate
the western-centrism of IR theory as they are complicit in hiding
the myriad ways in which international politics is made and
remade. The alternative is not to suggest that Denmark e and
Tanzania e always matter in and of themselves, but is instead to
challenge the ontological basis of much IR and geopolitical theory.
John Agnew (2007) has argued that IR has been dominated by US
and European understandings of the state and world-economy and
so has argued for the need for attention to be given to the geog-
raphy of knowledge in international politics:
Such geographies, however, are not ends in themselves. The
point is to understand the ontological bases of knowing from
perspectives that do not either privilege a singular history of
knowledge associated with a speciﬁc world region (a typical
relativism) or presume conceptions of knowledge that implicitly
or explicitly assume their own self-evident universality
(a typical positivism) (Agnew, 2007: 139).
Instead, Agnew (2007: 146) highlights the fact that “knowledge
is made as it circulates; it is never made completely in one place
and then simply consumed as is elsewhere”.
Recognising these tensions, Ayoob’s concept of “subaltern real-
ism” presents an apparently oxymoronic pairing of terms, tying
together a position of structural weakness with a dominant way of
seeing, ordering and organising theworld and it is this tension that I
wish to bring to ‘subaltern geopolitics’ too. My intention is not to
appropriate ‘subaltern’ nor, in some grand gesture, to claim to offer
up some conceptual space for the term. Rather, by combining the
notions of subaltern e a presence relegated to the lower orders e
and geopolitics e a dominant form of knowledge that has attemp-
ted to order and regulate e I seek to present a term with the same
kinds of internal tensions and contradictions intended by “critical
geopolitics” (but perhaps now forgotten given the ubiquity of the
term (see also Dalby, 2010)). Subaltern geopolitics aims to draw out
a complex and entangled geographical imagination which recog-
nises thatwestern thought has always beene andmust always bee
so much more marked by its apparent other than has been recog-
nised, just as the history of contact and exchange means that the
idea of an unchanging other presence is an equal ﬁction. However,
so much of the ‘subaltern’ has been silenced in global discourse,
where only the concerns of the great states are noted. So, subaltern
geopolitics is an attempt towrite against a logicwhich is always and
everywhere tending towrite a ‘universal,’ to see instead how things
might look otherwise if we admitted that Denmark did matter (to
return to the famous example), that womenmatter, that during the
ColdWar, non-aligned states mattered, that various imaginations of
Pan-Africanismmatter. It is not, then, an argument for the inherent
value of any one projection but instead for the need for a political
geography that is open and engaging with a number of voices.
While studying political resistance and opposition to statecraft
is clearly important, it is necessary also to consider the ongoing
struggle over the role of the state as this formal politics must not
get completely overlooked as critical scholarship looks to ‘alter-
native’ spaces of politics. The postcolonial grounding of subaltern
geopolitics offers a challenge to those accounts which simply reject
the state and formal politics, recognising the ongoing lived
importance of such ‘scales’ while simultaneously highlighting their
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sensibility structured around the ﬁgure of the hybrid (Bhabha,
1994), and especially the concept of ‘mimicry,’ which is deﬁned
through strategy, subversion and survival; it “may be a way of
‘doing’ world politics in a seemingly ‘similar’ yet unexpectedly
‘different’ way” (Bilgin, 2008: 6). Mimicry does not suggest the
Other wishing to become the same, or that it is radically different,
but instead destabilises these binarised categories. It sets a different
path from anti-geopolitics which “represents an assertion of per-
manent independence from the state whoever is in power”
(Routledge, 1998: 245, emphasis in original).
Thus, unlike anti-geopolitics, subaltern geopolitics does not
position its subjects outside of the state and associated institutions.
It shares the “utopian” instincts of progressive geopolitics (Kearns,
2008, 2009) but with a desire to keep open to a range of voices
what such utopias might be (Sharp, 2011a). It is a positioning that
recognises the possibility that political identities can be established
through geographical representations that are neither fully ‘inside’
nor ‘outside’ (hooks, 1990), and thus seeks a model of political
subjectivity to challenge that perpetuated by dominant western
geopolitics that does not rely on otherness (see, for example, the
contributions to the special issue of Geoforum on Subaltern
Geopolitics: Harker, 2011; Koopman, 2011; Sharp, 2011b, 2011c;
Smith, 2011;Woon, 2011). Hence, in my use of the term ‘subaltern’ I
want to return to the original military meaning of this as “a lower
rank” (Childs & Williams, 1997: 333)e neither the commander, nor
outside of the ranks e an interpretation that I think ﬁnds similar-
ities with Ayoob. This recognises the entangled nature of global
political relations but in such a way that does not deny “the
asymmetry of power relations and the reproduction of subordi-
nating modes of representation” (Sharp, Routledge, Philo, &
Paddison, 2000; Slater, 2004: 194). A revisiting of post-colonial
Tanzania is illustrative of such subaltern geopolitics.Post-colonial Tanzania: Binadamu wote ni ndugu zangu, na
Afrika ni moja (all people are brethren and Africa is one)
From the rubble of World War II rose a bipolar Cold War that
threatened the existence of humanity. Hair-triggers on nuclear
weapons alongside heated debates on poverty, inequality, and
freedom threatened even those who did not live under the U.S.
or Soviet umbrellas [.] Thrown between these two major for-
mations the darker nations amassed as the Third World [.
Through the UN], aspects other than political equality came to
the fore: the Third World project included a demand for the
redistribution of the world’s resources, a more digniﬁed rate of
return for the labor power of their people, and a shared
acknowledgement of the heritage of science, technology, and
culture (Prashad, 2007: xvexvii).
Julius Nyerere led Tanganyika to independence from Britain in
1961, with Tanzania being created from the union with Zanzibar in
1964. Although initially seen as close to the west (and especially
Britain) because of the non-violent nature of the independence
movement and the respect Nyerere attained internationally as a
statesman, Nyerere was clear that Tanzania would avoid either of
the Cold War blocs and was a prominent advocate of both Pan-
Africanism and the Non-Aligned Movement. In 1967, the ruling
party introduced the Arusha Declaration which promoted equality,
self-reliance, ‘traditional’ African communal values, and the virtues
of education and hard work. Paralleling Fanon’s (1963) warning of
the “pitfalls of national consciousness” shaping newly-independent
African states, the Arusha Declaration was a stand against the
emerging indigenous elite, the wabenzi.3 The state would have
ownership of the means of production while citizens were to have“freedom of expression, of movement, of religious belief, and of
association.” This was a declaration for Tanzania but was outward
looking, stating also that Tanzania would seek liberation and unity
for all of Africa e and Tanzania maintained this commitment in its
subsequent status as a front line state in the ﬁght against the
apartheid regime in South Africa.
This placed the country at the forefront of Pan-Africanism, as a
place which promised a genuinely new way of organising society,
and a beacon for radical thinkers and activists from around the
world. Nyerere’s thinking beyond colonial-imposed boundaries and
towards a continental geopolitical imagination promised Africa a
presence and voice on the newworld stage. Many have commented
on the importance of Tanzania, especially after the Arusha Decla-
ration, in the geopolitical imagination of Pan-Africanism, giving it a
“magnetic appeal to the Black World [.] Tanzania captured their
hopes, it set ﬁre to their imagination for its uncompromising
commitment to human dignity, regardless of skin color” (Karioki,
1979: 200). On visiting the country, US activist Angela Davis “pro-
claimed that Tanzania was an inspiration” (Karioki, 1979: 205)
while CLR James famously claimed that the Arusha Declarationwas
“the highest stage of resistance ever reached by revolting blacks”.
Initially Tanzania experienced impressive improvements in life
expectancy and achieved nearly universal literacy (rising from a
ﬁgure of around 15% at independence), although this was in large
part the result of signiﬁcant foreign aid. With the signiﬁcant
exception of the events leading to the union of Tanganyika with
Zanzibar in 1964 (see, for example, Mwakikagile, 2008; Shivji,
2008), post-colonial Tanzania has been relatively peaceful,
without the intertribal conﬂicts characteristic of other states in the
region. Nyerere and subsequent presidents stood down at the end
of their terms in ofﬁce, and, again unusually in the region,
continued to live in the country; there have been no presidential
assassinations in Tanzania.
However Nyerere’s economic policies have been less successful.
Commentators have linked this to a combinationof, on theonehand,
structural changes in the global economy and, on the other, the
failure of collective socialism e with the exact combination of
reasoning reﬂecting the ideological position of the observer. Despite
the legacy of this failure, Nyerere was e and is still e held in high
regard in Africa and around the world. His name is nearly always
preceded byMwalimu, the Swahili word for ‘teacher’which conveys
a particular sense of experience and wisdom. Young (2004: 47) ar-
gues that although “the Nyerere vision of the popular socialist polity
failed by anymeasure in the policy realm, the moral rectitude of the
Mwalimu preserved his image as a charismatic leader dedicated to
the common weal”. After his retirement from Tanzanian politics,
Nyerere lead the Organisation of African Unity and the South Com-
mission, and was regularly called in to negotiate regional disputes.
His vision for a united Africa is perhaps his greatest legacy. However,
it is not a legacy that has found a place in political geography.
Nyerere’s Pan-African geopolitics
. every possible attempt is made to squeeze African events into
the framework of the cold war or other Big Power conﬂicts. The
big question is always: ‘Is this or that African country pro-East or
pro-West?’ These kinds of questions [.] are based on a very
fundamental mistake e and, I would add, an unwarranted de-
gree of arrogance! They imply that Africa has no ideas of its own
and no interests of its own. They assume the exclusive validity of
the international conﬂicts which existed when we achieved
nationhood. They are based on the belief that African actions
must inevitably be determined by reference to either the
Western liberal tradition or to communist theory or practice.
(Nyerere, 1969 cited in Nyerere, 1974b: 43).
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precarity of the new post-colonial states, seeing this precarity as
the result of both a militarised Cold War geopolitical system and a
dominant and manipulative capitalist neo-colonial one. He pressed
for Third World solidarity or, as he put it, a “trade union of the
poor”. While he was clear in recognising the signiﬁcance of military
power in geopolitical affairs, discussing the inﬂuence of quite
conventional geopolitical discourse e such as proximity and “the
facts of geography and history” e he was quick to emphasise that
“the basic reality of that situation, the real cause of our military
circumstances is our economic weakness.” While military geopo-
litical power has carved up the Cold War world, he acknowledged
that the ‘big powers’ can have their way without using military
power at all:
The real and urgent threat to the independence of almost all the
non-aligned states, thus, comes not from the military, but from
the economic power of the big states. It is poverty which con-
stitutes our greatest danger (Nyerere, 1970 cited in Nyerere,
2011: 5).
Nyerere’s ambition was to overcome this poverty by developing
national economies in such a way which does not “run the risk of
being sucked into the orbit of one or other of the big powers”
(Nyerere, 1970 cited in Nyerere, 2011: 6). The establishment of the
Non-Aligned Movement, and Nyerere’s philosophy of Pan-
Africanism was based upon a clear challenge to classical military
power geopolitical principles. In a speech in 1970, Nyerere scripted
non-aligned south-south geopolitics as an alternative to the ‘clear
and opposing power blocs’ of the Cold War. Referring to the ﬁrst
non-aligned meeting of 1961, Nyerere claimed that:
. just by the fact of meeting e asserting the independence of
either bloc, themember states of that conferencewere taking an
important political action: they were announcing that a refusal
to become an ally of either side was not a temporary aberration
of a few states! It was an important new international devel-
opment, which the big powers could not ignore. [.] The con-
ference members did not claim to have great armed forces, and
their meeting did not mark any change in the military ‘balance
of power’. But, the conference declared the existence of boundaries
to the exercise of that military power. Its members made clear
that they were not going to be willing participants in the Cold
War struggle. The dangerous game of threat and counter-threat
which was being played between the big powers and their
‘allies’ or ‘satellites’ no longer involved every nation of theworld
(Nyerere, 1970 cited in Nyerere, 2011: 2; emphasis mine).
Illustrating well Ayoob’s (2010) reﬂections on the differences
between dominant and subaltern states, Nyerere’s subaltern
geopolitics regarded the international as unaccountable e but not
unaccountable to all, just to the states of Africa and the South. His
speeches revealed the nature of western geopolitical power as
being based in military and economic domination e forms of
violence that he was quick to challenge. He often replied to those
who accused him of being undemocratic with his one party state
that their obsession was with other states’ democracy while
accepting the international as totally undemocratic:
In the world at large, however, there is neither international
democracy nor any clear centre of authority at which the poor
can direct their protests. For example, when the world price of
copper falls by 50 per cent in one week, the national income of
Zambia drops like a stone; its workers will protest (perhaps
violently). But they direct their anger at the government of
Zambia, which has no power at all in this matter. What else can
the workers do? They cannot affect the decisions of this vaguething called the international ‘market’, even though what poor
Zambia has lost some wealthy countries have gained. The poor
of Zambia are without inﬂuence in this matter. But the gov-
ernment of Zambia has no inﬂuence either. [.] The rich and
powerful countries of the world preach democracy to the poor
nations and when it suits them they are liable to apply sanctions
against those countries which they designate as undemocratic
or acting against human rights. But the same preachers of de-
mocracy at the national level ﬁght actively against any kind of
democracy at the international level. (Nyerere, 1999: 585e586).
Nyerere’s example perfectly illustrates Archibugi’s argument
that democracy at a country-level is meaningless if in a truly global
world there is no democracy beyond country boundaries (in Painter
& Jeffrey, 2009: 90e91). Furthermore, from themarginal position in
the world system from where their subaltern geopolitics were
scripted, it was all too clear to Third World leaders how power
worked in this global system. While Tanzania’s path to indepen-
dence was characterised by non-violence, Nyerere did not eschew
violence (as his commitment to offering shelter to anti-colonial
movements from southern Africa who used violent tactics
demonstrated). He was all too aware of the violence in the world
order into which Tanganyika and then Tanzania had come into
being:
. peace by itself is not enough for the human spirit if it means
just an absence of violent conﬂict [.] peace and human justice
are interlinked, and should be interlinked. Those of us who are
free todevelop ourselves andour nationhaveno right todemand
that the oppressed, the victims of discrimination, the starving
and the persecuted, should acquiesce in their present condition.
If we do make such a demand we are ourselves becoming their
persecutors and their oppressors. The peace which exists
while such human conditions prevail is neither secure nor
justiﬁable (Nyerere, 1968 cited in Nyerere, 1974a: 1e2).
This was not then simply a vision of non-alignment as neutrality,
instead, he argued that it is, “or certainly ought to be, a policy of
involvement in world affairs”. Nyerere realised that African leaders
had to seek this out wherever possible, and to be proactive in order
to hold off the manipulation of their weakness by external forces:
African unity is essential to the continent as a whole and to
every part of it. Politically we have inherited boundaries which
are either unclear or such ethnological and geographical
nonsense that they are a fruitful source of disagreements. And
such disagreements, if allowed to develop, would lead to awaste
of scarce resources in the building up of national armies
(Nyerere, 1963 cited in Nyerere, 1967c: 212).
The way to achieve this, he argued, was to use African nation-
alisms as a building block to a united Africa. The international was a
space of neo-colonial capitalism where economic and military po-
wer ruled. Nyerere rejected this logic and sought to change it
through the forms of connection that could come from Pan-
Africanism. As the countries of Africa gradually gained their inde-
pendence from Europe, Nyerere recognised the danger of the
weakness of each leading to possible interventions by one or the
other of the Cold War superpowers. He wrote of his fears of “The
second scramble” for the continent, where the superpowers
would use their inﬂuence to incite conﬂict between the newly-
independent states, arguing that “the weaker amongst us are
regarded as no more than pawns in the Cold War conﬂicts” (1963
cited in Nyerere, 1967b: 205). And yet, Nyerere recognised the
power of nationalism as a means of uniting the disparate tribes and
ethnic groups in each newly-independent African state, to assist in
moving beyond conﬂict for power and resources towards unity.
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Nyerere’s vision included a nationalism that would unite Tanga-
nyikan, and later Tanzanian, people despite tribal, religious, lin-
guistic or ethnic differences. “In Tanzania, it was more than one
hundred tribal units which lost their freedom; it was one nation
that regained it.” (Nyerere, 1969: 44) It was not a bourgeois Euro-
pean form of nationalism, but instead an outwardly looking one.
Having come into contact with a civilization which has over-
emphasized the freedom of the individual, we are in fact faced
with one of the big problems of Africa in the modernworld. Our
problem is just this: how to get the beneﬁts of European society
e beneﬁts that have been brought about by an organization
based upon the individual e and yet retain African’s own
structure of society in which the individual is a member of a
kind of fellowship (Nyerere, 1960).
Thus, Nyerere’s was an “alternative modernity” (see Moore &
Sanders, 2001), drawing both on concepts from traditional Afri-
can society e most notably ideas of interdependence and class-
lessness in his idea of ujamaa e and those from modern western
thought. Although his vision was for a united Africa, it was the
concept of nationalism that he drew on to develop the building
blocs of identity e ﬁrst Tanzanian and then Eastern African. He
recognised the challenges of post-colonial nation-building in terms
of overcoming the divisions of tribe, religion and ethnicity that had
been ignored in the colonial process of territorial division. So, while
we can see the relevance of Benedict Anderson’s (1983) ideas of
“imagined communities” being drawn upon in the construction of
the Tanzanian state, this was an outward-looking community-
building, and not one based on deﬁning Tanzanian-ness fromwhat
was outside and different. Nyerere actively promoted Swahili as the
national (and regional) language, “a widely understood and
increasingly popular language which was neither identiﬁed with
any one tribal group nor with the colonial power [which] was a
great asset to the nationalists” (Mytton, 1983: 114). As Chaterjee
(1986) has argued for post-colonial India, Tanzanian nationalism
embodied this contradiction producing “a discourse in which, even
as it challenged the colonial claim to political domination [.] also
accepted the very intellectual premises of ‘modernity’ on which
colonial domination was based”. The internal spaces of ujamaa
were to be mobilised through the public ‘modern’ spaces of
governance and national expression.
Although he promoted nationalism in Africa as a ﬁrst stage
(unlike Ghana’s independence leader, Kwame Nkrumah, who
wanted to go straight to Pan-Africanism from colonialism), nation-
building was ultimately aimed at transcending the tribal and ethnic
differences that Nyerere anticipated would tear apart independent
Africa. For Nyerere, African nationalism, if played out in a conven-
tional way, would fall into the hands of neo-colonial powers. Thus
he insisted that African nationalism must be different:
As I have said once before, the role of African nationalism is
different e or should be different e from the nationalism of the
past. We must use the African national states as an instrument
for the reuniﬁcation of Africa. African nationalism is meaning-
less, is anachronistic, and is dangerous, if it is not at the same
time Pan-African (Nyerere, 1963 cited in Nyerere, 1967a: 194).
Nyerere argued for the necessity that the “present boundaries
must lose their signiﬁcance and become merely a demarcation
of administrative areas within a larger unit” (Nyerere, 1963
cited in Nyerere, 1967c: 212), but recognised that this was
becoming more difﬁcult by the day as African states used the
trappings of nationalism in their attempts to overcome tribal
rivalries.The boundaries which divide African states are so nonsensical
that without our sense of unity theywould be a cause of friction.
But we have no alternative but start from the positionwhich we
inherited after the colonial partition of Africa. There is no one
country which does not include areas which would come under
another political unit if any principles of political geography
were considered, and numerous tribes live in at least two
countries or have their origins in some other area of Africa. Yet
for us to start making ‘claims’ on each other’s territory would be
to play into the hands of those who wish to keep Africa weak so
as to improve their own relative strength in the future, and it
might well lead us to the tragic absurdity of spending money on
armaments while our people die for want of medical attention
or starve for want of knowledge (Nyerere, 1963 cited in Nyerere,
1967a: 189).
The ultimate goal, he insisted, had to be “nothing short of a
United States of Africa”. He developed these ideas further in his
article on “The policies and purposes of Pan-Africanism,” published
in 1963:
There is only one way inwhich Africa can stay outside irrelevant
world conﬂicts and in which she can hope to deal with
oppressing economic and social problems which now beset her
people. The present boundaries must lose their signiﬁcance and
become merely a demarcation of administrative areas within a
larger unit. This is an urgent and difﬁcult matter; it becomes
more difﬁcult every day as the existing nation states ﬁght trib-
alism by building nationalism. But there is, for the time being,
the saving grace of an emotional unity, born during the inde-
pendence struggle, and the universal recognition of the need for
its development in political and economic terms (Nyerere, 1963
cited in Nyerere, 1967c: 212e213).Doing subaltern geopolitics
Nyerere’s views on the responsibility to others were put into
practice in geopolitical discourse and actions at a variety of scales,
reinforcing the Tanzanian leader’s scripting of the scalar connec-
tions between individual and national responsibility and the wider
political and ethical connections within with Tanzania was entan-
gled. At the continental scale was Tanzania’s responsibility to other
Africans. Nyerere famously offered to hold off Tanganyikan inde-
pendence until uhuru (freedom) was achieved by Kenya and
Uganda, for he felt that freedom for his country would be mean-
ingless while other East Africans were still colonised. Nyerere was
also quick to back those ﬁghting apartheid and white minority rule
in southern Africa. After Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of In-
dependence in November 1965, the Organisation of African Unity
recommended that if Britain refused to crush Ian Smith’s illegal
regime, diplomatic ties should be severed. As perhaps the single
most important front line state in the battle against racism and
apartheid in southern Africa, Tanzania was quick to take this action
despite this meaning the loss of $22m in an interest-free loan that
had been negotiated with Britain but not yet signed: “Nyerere
admitted that the freeze on the loan threw Tanzania’s First Five Year
Plan off balance, but then argued that some principles were more
important than short-run economic gains” (Karioki, 1979: 193). In
addition, one of the key events which created the desperate con-
ditions of the Tanzanian economy in the early 1980s, forcing the
country to go to the IMF and accept the conditions of structural
adjustment, was Nyerere’s commitment to ﬁghting Idi Amin in
Uganda.
At the same time, Nyerere’s attention to the nature of nation-
alism ensured his model of geopolitics was ﬁrmly linked to the
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the embodied consequences of colonialism (and the importance of
a strong rejection of this system) echoed the ideas of Frantz Fanon
(1986) and was apparent in his reﬂection upon early African
independence:
When Kwame Nkrumahwas released from prison this produced
a transformation. I was in Britain and oh you could see it in the
Ghanaians! They became different human beings, different from
all the rest of us (in Bunting, 1999: np).
Nyerere’s subaltern geopolitics was one that, while recognising
the ontological realities of the scales of certain political structurese
the boundaries of new states in Africa, the effects of the interna-
tional economy e did not see these boundaries as natural nor
inevitably containing. For him, security came not from bounding
danger but by looking outward at shared conditions, shared pre-
carity to this system. It highlights a clearly moral geopolitics (a
strategy of power Larsen (2011) argues is often used by small
states), withinwhich Nyerere was all too aware of the limitations of
state power available to him. Thus, his performance of sovereignty
was one that constantly invoked moral power (instead of economic
or military power) to claim global inﬂuence. This performance of
sovereignty is one that is much more about normative ideals of the
state than a description of the state itself: “relative and negotiated e
a strategy and a processe rather than something that is fundamental
and absolute” (Steinberg & Chapman, 2009: 284).
Nyerere’s geopolitical vision for Pan-Africanism thus anticipated
Judith Butler’s insistence that we reimagine the “possibility of
community on the basis of vulnerability and loss” (2004: 20).
Rather than a western universalist, or masculinist, form of
cosmopolitanism which “accepts normative framings of liberal
democratic deliberation, and choice-making, self-reﬂective sub-
jects, Butler sees subjects as endlessly (re)constituted through
dialectical processes of recognition, within multiple networks of
power” (Mitchell, 2007: 6). Nyerere’s postcolonialism visualised
and internalised this relationality across the imagined and material
borders of the nation state. Nyerere recognised the disruptive to-
pographies (Katz, 2001) in the construction of Tanzanian political
community, stretched across state boundaries, but grounded in the
recognition of their place in the remaking of identities and the
possibilities of connection. Through this act of recognition, the self
does not precede the Other but they are brought into being
simultaneously, comprehending vulnerability and unequal power
relations. Throughout, then, and unlike negritude or the interna-
tional solidarities of the Black Panthers (for example, see Tyner,
2006), Nyerere’s was a Pan-Africanism that was not deﬁned by
race; it was one that recognised nationalism as a process of
rejecting divisive tribal and ethic divisions which was not in any
way incompatible with an African identity; it was an outward
looking set of connections. He frequently insisted upon the inclu-
siveness of citizenship in ﬁrst Tanganyika and then Tanzania: “This
is a matter of simple honesty and of trying to live up to the repu-
tation we have earned as being a country which is concerned with
principles. This action is not taken ‘for the sake of people with
brown or white skin,’ but for Tanganyika” he argued in January
1964 (Nyerere, 1967c: 259).
There is no question that Nyerere played a signiﬁcant role in
scripting the geopolitics of Tanzania’s and Africa’s role within the
emerging post-colonial world order. As a ﬁgure most often asso-
ciated with a deeply moral perspective e even by many of his po-
litical opponents e Nyerere’s narration of the geopolitical system
also included a call to subjectivity on the part of those hearing or
reading his speeches and writings. As well as scripting an alterna-
tive to the geopolitical order of the Cold War binary, Nyerere pro-
jected a subaltern subjectivity which challenged the binaries ofCold War geopolitics, of colonialism, of race and of political ideol-
ogy. This paper is not seeking to evaluate Nyerere’s policies; that
has been done elsewhere (e.g. Legum & Mmari, 1995; McDonald &
Sahle, 2003). However, it is important not to romanticise Nyerere’s
role. He and the ruling TANU (later CCM4) party wanted to create
socialism in a hurry (Prashad, 2007) e they didn’t have time to go
through the stages described and debated by Marxists e as illus-
trated in the title of one of Nyerere’s books,We must run while they
walk. There were authoritarian acts: the insistence of the necessity
of a single party state (although seats were always contested),
agricultural collectivisation leading to the forced relocation of a
signiﬁcant percentage of the rural population in the late 1970s
(Briggs, 1979), and other suggestions of strong arm tactics to ensure
the leadership’s vision was promoted. Nyerere was desperately
trying to create African socialists from a population of uneducated
peasants to take forward his vision of Africa and its place in the
modern world order, and he believed that through education and
the state run media his ideas would eventually take hold in the
popular imagination; but at the start it was an inherently top-down
affair.
Despite this, Tanzania and Nyerere’s vision for it placed the
country at the heart of a newly-emerging post-colonial interna-
tionalism. This is, of course, because the creation of post-colonial
Tanzania was not only achieved through formal government pol-
icy. Tanzania emerged as a presence in the world order that had
particular meaning: Tanzania became a Front Line State in the ﬁght
against Apartheid and white minority rule in southern Africa; it
became a leading proponent of Pan-Africanism and the non-
aligned movement; it became a a place of return for African-
Americans; and, particularly at the University of Dar es Salaam, a
point of intellectual debate for radical academics and students.
Tanzania e as a state in the world system and as a geopolitical
presence e was established through all of these entangled scales
and processes.
Geopolitical sites
The Arusha Declaration, Tanzania’s status as a front line State in
the liberation of Southern Africa and Nyerere’s attempt to steer a
new course of politics and geopolitics through its negotiation of a
national, continental and global path was a heady mix. Although as
the 1970s unfolded, cracks in the dream began to show, this vision
continued to draw people from around the world into the 1980s.
Tanzania became “a magnet then for anti-colonial activists and
thinkers from all over the world” (Bunting, 1999: np). Some were
ANC members ﬂeeing persecution in southern Africa, some com-
rades came from Eastern Europe and Mao’s China, and others came
from the west, seeking an alternative to what they saw at home.
Importantly, this was not seen as amove relating to development or
to provide a helping hand in the Third World or in a developing
country; rather, many of the intellectuals who were drawn to
Tanzania came because they saw this as offering the future. There
was a belief that a tectonic shift in political and ideological lead-
ership was not only possible but immanent, and Tanzania was at
the heart of this. Thus, there were a number of sites where sub-
altern geopolitics were performed beyond e and sometimes in
tension with e the site of Nyerere’s state geopolitics. Such sites
included the training camps for southern African resistance
movements, communities of African-Americans and cosmopolitan
groups of academics, most notably at the University of Dar es
Salaam.
The University of Dar es Salaam, located atMlimani, a hill around
10 km from the centre of Tanzania’s largest city, was one site of
intense (geo)political debate in the early post-colonial years.
Through research and teaching, staff and students on “The Hill”
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and particularly that of their own leader, Nyerere. But it was also a
beacon for radical thinkers and activists from around theworld. In a
recent interviewwith Giovanni Arrighi (2009: np) about his time in
Dar es Salaam, the interviewer, David Harvey, starts off by saying
that it “sounded like a paradise of intellectual interactions,” leading
Arrighi to respond:
It was a very exciting time, both intellectually and politically.
When I got to Dar es Salaam in 1966, Tanzania had only been
independent for a few years. Nyerere was advocating what he
considered to be a form of African socialism. Hemanaged to stay
equidistant from both sides during the Sino-Soviet split, and
maintained very good relations with the Scandinavians. Dar es
Salaam became the outpost of all the exiled national liberation
movements of southern Africadfrom the Portuguese colonies,
Rhodesia and South Africa. I spent three years at the University
there, and met all kinds of people: activists from the Black Po-
wer movement in the US, as well as scholars and intellectuals
like Immanuel Wallerstein, David Apter, Walter Rodney, Roger
Murray, Sol Picciotto, Catherine Hoskins, Jim Mellon, who later
was one of the founders of the Weathermen, Luisa Passerini,
whowas doing research on Frelimo, andmany others; including,
of course, John Saul.
Tanzanian theorists and the collection of academics that were
drawn to the University of Dar es Salaam from around the globe,
debated the ways in which this new world order could be made.
Inﬂuential ﬁgure Walter Rodney made it clear that this was some-
thing to come from the grass roots of African society, that “every
African has a responsibility to understand the system and work for
its overthrow” (Rodney, 1972/2012: 28). It was an intellectual
environment that proved unusually stimulating to those involved.
Commentators have argued that Rodney’s “was an awesome vision,
especially since Walter dared to say and believe that such a stu-
pendous transformation must be initiated by Africans and other
dwellers in the nether regions of exploitation and domination”
(Harding, Hill, & Strickland, 2012: xvii). As Issa Shivji, a student of
Walter Rodney and now one of Tanzania’s most prominent critical
scholars, explained, “we thought globally. We thought in terms of
epochs, not in terms of a tomorrow, not in terms of years, not in
terms of decades, but in terms of epochs” (Shivji,1992 cited in Shivji,
1993: 204).
The knowledge created at The Hill responded to Nyerere’s
geopolitical challenge. Just as Nyerere’s subaltern geopolitics was
challenging international boundaries, intellectual debate at the
University was challenging conventional disciplinary boundaries.
Emphasis was put on interdisciplinary studies, insisting that
whether studying law, social science or science subjects, members
of the university should have a wide and critical education. Shivji
explains:
The great strength of that period, it seems tome, was the critical
attitude. Nothing was taken for granted. Everything was sub-
jected to criticism and evaluation. The intellectual at that time
saw himself/herself as a social critic, not as a careerist, or simply
an armchair contemplator or thinker. The spirit of the time, if I
may summarise it in a phrase, was ‘doubt everything’ e not as a
cynic, but as a critic [.] not simply as a contemplative philos-
opher but as an historical actor (Shivji, 1992 cited in Shivji, 1993:
211).Conclusions
This paper has sought to reconsider the political interventions of
Tanzania, as a new post-colonial state in the 1960s and 1970s, ascritical geopolitics. Therewas great political and intellectual foment
in many African nations at this point and for many such societies,
rather than representing marginal locations in the remaking of the
second half of the 20th century, they actually promised the location
of the real drivers of change. However, for a variety of reasons,
including the “failure” in practice of many of the post-colonial
leaders’ visions of new societies, and the impacts of structural
adjustment policies in the 1980s, this challenge has fallen from
accounts of geopolitics.5 And yet, there is much still to be learnt
from the geopolitics of subaltern cosmopolitanisms, of which, as
Gilmore (2008: 34) has argued, “Pan-Africanism is a long-standing,
and by no means outmoded example”.
Recently there has been greater attention in the arts and social
sciences on the signiﬁcance of marginal literatures. In terms of
Africa, as Mbembe (2001: np) has argued, the continent has been
systematically omitted from social theory so that one “consequence
of this blindness is that Africa’s politics and economics have been
condemned to appear in social theory only as the sign of a lack,
while the discourse of political science and development eco-
nomics has become that of a quest for the cause of that lack.” Thus,
as Pletsch (1981) so compellingly articulated, in the academic di-
vision of labour Africa has tended to be the site of development-
based research, with much less focus from other parts of the
discipline, and especially from political geography.
At the same time, postcolonialism has been critiqued for its
armchair theorising and the fact that, for postcolonialism to
become established, third world academics have had to take up
residence in the ﬁrst world. Yet, in the years following indepen-
dence, Pan-Africanism and other subaltern geopolitics forged
around non-alignment created grounded, embedded alternative
reworkings of western political thought and practice. Ahluwalia
(2005) has insisted that post-structuralism has its roots in North
Africa, pointing to the fact that key post-structural thinkers such as
Louis Althusser and Jacques Derrida were born in Algeria “and
spent formative years there” and Michel Foucault spent “an
important sojourn in Tunisia” (Shilliam, 2009: np). Ahluwalia traces
the inﬂuences of this grounding on the emergence of post-
structuralism and a similar thing could be done for the inﬂuence
of the post-colonial Tanzanian context on the thinking of such in-
tellectuals as Walter Rodney, Paul Saul, Giovanni Arrighi and Ter-
ence Ranger.6 Such genealogies challenge the Eurocentric accounts
we have of the emergence of different forms of modern political
thought. As Shilliam (2009: np) continues:
.Eurocentrism is most evident in the unspoken assumption
that we do not need to attempt to travel to the intellectual
terrain of the non-West and interrogate its archive of thought in
order to problematize the modern experience. It is not just that
the non-Western thinker must be added into the existing
archive of the Western Academy, but rather, than an engage-
ment with the non-Western thinker might be necessary in order
to reveal the boundedness of this Academy and thus open the
way for more salient explorations of the making of the modern
world order.
In countries like Tanzania, and especially in sites of active po-
litical theorising such as was found at the University of Dar es
Salaam in the 1970s, the ‘margins’were seene however brieﬂye as
offering the future ‘centre’; people were drawn to Africa from
around Africa and from both Western and Eastern superpowers.
Thus, post-colonial Tanzania presented, for a time, a material
‘provincializing of Europe’ as Chakrabarty (2000) has put it, as in-
tellectuals and political and resistant ﬁgures from north and south
moved to participate in and learn fromNyerere’s Tanzania. So it was
not a simple case of westernised knowledge coming to Tanzania
and colonising debates; Nyerere reworked western political
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African future, and many of the western academics and the debates
they took back home were profoundly Tanzanian-ized.
These are not stories of internationalism from ‘below’ or
‘outside’, but are geographies that have been recast from the mar-
gins, from and by people who have been differently entangled with
networks of domination and resistance, who can neither be seen as
below or outside, but nor could they be seen as powerful, central or
dominant. They do, however, challenge prevailing views that sug-
gest the subaltern is always trapped in place, and is particular and
‘other’ to western travelling theories, and so present an important
counter to accounts of internationalism, geopolitics and cosmo-
politanism which place the subaltern, and political action
emanating from them, as place bound (see also Featherstone,
2012). Tanzania’s extra-territorial connections, of course, did not
begin with European colonialism. As the Arabic, Hindi and Bantu
contributions to Swahili attest, what is now Tanzania has long been
connected to currents of trade and politics that have linked the
cultures of East Africa’s “Swahili coast” to the Gulf States and to
India for centuries, in addition to the colonial connections to Ger-
many and Britain (Sheriff, 2010).
And thus, what we can learn fromTanzania should not only be of
relevance to those with ‘African interests’. In his call for a “small
state geopolitics,” Larsen (2011) insists on the need to understand
the multiplicity of geopolitical visions because of the always-
already entangled nature of different state geopolitics. Drawing
on the recent “Mohammed cartoon scandal” Larsen (2011: 245)
insists that Denmark does matter and that this was highlighted by
this event as Denmark shifted from “the habitual self-image of
being a paragon of virtue inworld politics, a small state but a moral
great power [to a situation in which] Danes too were now faced
with the question: ‘Why do they hate us?’”.
Just as “small statehood” then is not simply a particular location,
nor should “subaltern” be ﬁxed in particular places. Instead, the
subaltern can be understood as “located both outside (exterior to)
and at themargins of (but still inside) a social and spatial formation,
and, congruently, as both separate from, and as an effect of, power”
(Clayton, 2011: 247). Larsen suggests that the power that can be
drawn upon by marginal states is a moral authority, a power that
has certainly deﬁned post-colonial Tanzania’s role e particularly
under Nyerere. However, Mbembe (2003: 33) explains how the
changes imposed by structural adjustment proceeded incremen-
tally to undermine the authority of visionary Third World leaders
such as Nyerere, destroying “the economic underpinnings of po-
litical authority and order in the 1970s, followed by the loss of value
in local currencies in the 1980s”. The penetration of individual
economies by external agencies through the provision of aid, the
desire to attract international investment and the power of
western-dominated international organisations further erodes
state sovereignty in the South and reinforces the very limited na-
ture of sovereignty available (see Sharp, in press). Agnew (2005)
has suggested that this is not a characteristic only of states in the
south, suggesting that many states have much less control over
their destinies than conventional models of the state would imply.
This suggests that perhaps this is exactly the time where a more
ambitious geopolitical imagination is required. Whether consid-
ering the challenges of economies, technologies and biological
threats that do not recognise state borders, or the geopolitics of
climate change in the “Anthropocene”, it would seem that moving
from an idea of a geopolitics forged around the individual interests
of states to a more inclusive vision, is essential (Dalby, 2012). This
means that revisiting attempts to imagine collective geopolitical
futures such as those offered by Pan-Africanism is invaluable.
This raises the question of what might be learnt from the con-
ditions that facilitated these critical interventions in post-colonialTanzania, and how we might draw on these experiences to seek to
recreate conditions of such optimism and hope. Prashad has argued
for the importance of such visions and is pessimistic (perhaps
overly so) about a future without them:
The demise of the Third World has been catastrophic. People
across the three continents continue to dream of something
better, and many of them are organised into social movements
or political parties. Their aspirations have a local voice. Beyond
that, their hopes and dreams are unintelligible (Prashad, 2007:
xviii).
Such third worldism as explored by Prashad, outlined in the
writings of Julius Nyerere and attempted through his policies, and
lived by those living andworking in places like the University of Dar
es Salaam presents a kind of postcolonial subjectivity within which
subjects are reconstituted through recognition of shared vulnera-
bility, and a shared desire to challenge this situation and indeed to
change it, rather than being an identity premised on the exclusion
of otherness.
In his discussion of the geopolitics of Nkrumah’s Ghana, White
(2003: 110) argues that the narrative of a binary opposition be-
tween Cold War modernity and indigenous African society is a
false one; rather Ghana was “laid at the intersection of multiple
roads of modernity.” Nkrumah’s outlook was modern, but “his
situation nonetheless left him with many ways forward, placing
him at a site of ‘creative adaptation’ which Goankar describes as
‘the site where a people ‘make’ themselves modern, as opposed to
being ‘made’ modern by alien and imperial forces’” (cited in White,
2003: 110). The Non-Aligned Movement’s alternative geopolitical
vision for development was one such modernity, consciously
rejecting the totality of either the Soviet or US projections of
modern futures. And it was a moral geopolitics based around
connection rather than a sovereign performance of exclusion.
Tanzanian geopolitics have been (and, in some ways, continue to
be (see Sharp, 2011c)) constructed dialectically in terms of the
country’s role in promoting diverse futures: an African identity,
Cold War non-alignment, a Pan-African vision, and a place of
radical, alternative thought for people from around the world.
Most important is the recognition of shared vulnerability, and a
shared desire to challenge this situation and indeed to change it,
rather than being an identity premised on the exclusion of
otherness. Nyerere recognised this global interdependence clearly.
In his address to the United Nations following Tanganyika’s inde-
pendence from Britain, he said:
I do congratulate the British for taking yet a further step towards
their own achievement of complete independence and freedom
because I believe that no country is completely free if it keeps
other people in a state of unfreedom (Nyerere, 1961 cited in
Nyerere, 1967e: 145).
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Endnotes
1 Initially introduced as an irreducibly critical concept, critical geopolitics was
intended as a critique of knowledge rather than a form of knowledge itself (Dalby,
pers corr., 2012). The ubiquity e and perhaps sometimes unthinking or uncritical
use e of the termmore recently has rendered it, in many cases, more of a subﬁeld of
political geography.
2 I continue to use the term Third World despite the conclusion of the Cold War
geopolitics that created the term, in recognition of the political reappropriation of
the concept by political ﬁgures such as Nyerere.
3 So called because of their preference for luxurious Mercedes Benz cars.
4 TANU: Tanganyikan African National Union party. After the union with Zanzibar, it
became the Tanzania African National Union party and later merged with the
Zanzibar-based Afro Shirazi Party to become Chama Cha Mapinduzi (party of the
revolution).
5Mamdani (2011) has also pointed to the changing nature of academic practice in
many African countries as a result of structural adjustment policies as contributing
to a shift away from critical academic practice in many academic departments in
East Africa.
6 In both cases, the list of characters is overwhelmingly male making a feminist
investigation of the history of this period especially important.References
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